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Albert J. Reiss, Jr., and Michael Tonry
Organizational Crime
Perhaps the most striking revolution of the twentieth century was the
rapid expansion of the population of organizations. As the century
draws to a close, the population of profit, not-for-profit, and govern-
mental organizations in the United States rivals in number the popula-
tion of individuals.
Both organizations and individuals may be regarded as behaving
under the law. Many organizations, created by the acts of individuals,
of corporate organizations, or of governments, are given a legal iden-
tity. Under the law, organizations are accorded distinct properties,
such as a corporate form, a domicile, and recognition as a not-for-
profit, a profit-making, or a governmental entity. Organizations can be
held accountable for their behavior under the law, without any of the
individuals who took actions on behalf of the organization being held
legally accountable. Capital and not-for-profit organizations, for exam-
ple, can be fined for violations of law-even to the point of bankruptcy.
They can be placed on probation for violations of laws and be required
to meet special conditions or perform community service, much as is
the case for sanctioned individuals.
This volume consists of case studies of organizational violations of
law. Each is limited to patterned violations of civil and criminal law
and patterned evasions of administrative regulations by organizations
in an organizational network. The focus is on the behavior of organiza-
tions in that network, rather than on specific individuals who commit
those violations. For example, in essays on savings and loan organiza-
tions, the central focus is not on any particular organization, such as
the Lincoln Savings and Loan Association, but on understanding the
widespread violations within the S&L industry. We are less interested
in how and why individuals committed violations than in why so many
individuals in particular roles in savings and loan organizations did
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so. Hence, our interest in people working within organizations is in
understanding their conduct in the pursuit of organizational purposes
or in understanding how employees in the pursuit of personal goals
victimize organizations by using their resources.
Violations by and within organizations are facilitated by the behav-
ior of other organizations in their or other networks. For example,
enforcers or regulators of organizational behavior in various ways may
account for the pattern of violations by organizations in the network.
To return to the S&L example, in planning this volume we were
not interested specifically in Charles Keating or in, say, the five U.S.
senators who became known as the "Keating Five" but in how people
in a class of organizations-the savings and loan industry-came to
behave as they did, and how the Keatings, the regulators, and the
congressmen came to behave as they did and do. Savings and loan
violations are embedded within larger environments and exchange sys-
tems, such as the structures of savings and lending, of regulation, and
even of congressional campaign financing, all of which are relevant to
understanding how a particular industry becomes involved in viola-
tions and how a regulatory system is compromised.
A caveat is in order, lest readers be misled into thinking that we are
not interested in specific cases such as the Lincoln Savings and Loan
Association debacle. We most certainly are to the degree that specific
cases enliven the exposition as examples. Writers were asked to seek
out telling and colorful examples.
We are interested in common-law crimes such as fraud and theft
only to the degree that they are part of the patterning of violations in
an organization. To return again to the S&L example, employees and
contractors of many specific S&L associations appear to have commit-
ted fraud in assessing the value of property for investment and may
personally have gained from doing so. We are interested in that em-
ployee behavior and its sanctioning only to the degree that it helps us
to understand how the industrial and organizational structure and the
structure of regulation gave rise to such behavior throughout much of
the S&L system. Many of the violations, for example, may be generic
common-law crimes of employee theft and fraud, but this is not an-
other book on how white-collar persons commit such crimes.
From an organizational perspective, however, violations by a partic-
ular class of individuals-for example, the affluent or those at the top
of an industry, or of the less affluent who often become involved in
the commission of violations-are less important than how persons of
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any class may become enmeshed in the patterned violations and hence
be open to individual prosecution under the criminal law, to tort liabil-
ity and litigation, or to regulatory sanctions like fines, loss of licenses,
or registrations.
About a decade ago Lawrence W. Sherman (1978) published a book,
entitled Scandal and Reform: Controlling Police Corruption, that illustrates
an organizational approach to unlawful behavior within organizations.
His central focus was on explaining how police organizations are cor-
rupted and why the reforms that follow are often ineffective. Although
scandals in cities such as New York and Oakland, California, are used
as illustrations, the central argument focuses on the fairly widespread
phenomenon of department corruption. Although in the corruption
scandal a substantial number of officers and employees at different
levels of police departments and organized criminal activity may be
processed as violators, the core of the explanation is on how and why
departments become corrupted and why there are repeated failures in
controlling the conduct that leads to organizational corruption.
I. Four Features of the Legal Control of Organizations
Most theories and conceptions of law violation and of victimization
center on persons rather than on organizations. Most criminological
theories, including subcultural, social learning, and structural opportu-
nity theories, focus on individuals and attempt to explain their behav-
iors. Causal theories in criminology center on individuals making ratio-
nal choices to offend or offending because of the influence of a plethora
of individual or situationally induced motives. Any examination of
different kinds of law violations, however, makes it clear that an em-
phasis solely or preponderantly on individuals can provide only an
incomplete and impoverished account of crime in America.
Once the search for improved understanding of the causes of crime
is widened to include organizations, four implications stand out. One
is that organizations are central offenders in many violations of law.
Most major violations of environmental pollution laws, for example,
are committed by public and private organizations rather than by pri-
vate individuals. It is organizations that must be controlled in the pub-
lic interest (Yeager, in this volume). Likewise, fraudulent record keep-
ing and billing is endemic in the American nursing home industry. To
remain financially solvent, many operators bill Medicaid for services
that are not rendered. Similarly, institutional neglect of the well-being
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of nursing home residents is more of a problem for nursing home
regulation than is employee abuse of residents (Braithwaite, in this
volume).
Second, organizations and collectivities of individuals (such as tax-
payers, or residents of a town or neighborhood, or members of an
association) are a major class of victims of crimes by individual offend-
ers and by organizations. Vandals who destroy public property, such
as parks and schools and public transportation equipment and facilities,
directly victimize a corporate entity and indirectly victimize collectivi-
ties of taxpayers and users. Organizations that collude in fixing the
prices of commodities or services may target organizations as well as
individuals as their victims. Reuter, in this volume, shows how collu-
sion in the cartage industry in the New York metropolitan area has
for many years significantly raised the price of garbage collection for
commercial establishments. Two essays on the savings and loan crisis
in this volume (Pontell and Calavita; Zimring and Hawkins) focus on
both the victimization of particular S&L organizations that became
insolvent and on the short- and long-run victimization of American
taxpayers who must absorb losses that would otherwise have fallen to
individual depositors and shareholders.
Third, many individual violations of law and almost all organiza-
tional violations involve use of an organization's position of significant
power, influence, or trust to commit the violation (Biderman and Reiss
1968). The insider trader who uses a position of access to information
that will affect the market price of shares is an example, as is the use
of appraisal, loan officer, corporate officer, and directors' positions in
the savings and loan crisis.
Finally, it is evident that many violations of law are committed
neither by individuals nor by organizations acting separately. Much
organizational lawbreaking involves the use of the organizational power
created by a network of organizations or the coercive power of a syndi-
cated network. Recent notorious examples include allegations of price-
fixing in bidding on public construction projects in many cities, allega-
tions of nationwide collusive bidding for military and public school
supply contracts by dairy products companies, and allegations of price-
fixing by domestic airlines. Reuter, in this volume, shows how the
coercive power of the Mafia, the network power of trade unions, and
ethnic and kinship networks were fundamental to creating and main-
taining segmented local markets in the early years of the cartage indus-
try in New York, New Jersey, and elsewhere. Later those combined
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powers and influences were replaced by racketeering organizations that
maintain discipline among the conspirators and inhibit customer com-
plaints. Reichman's account of insider trading in this volume depicts
it as enmeshed in a web of deal-making roles and relationships and
describes how insider trades can be unlawfully brokered through net-
works of even remotely connected participants. Those who unlawfully
take advantage of trading information may be far removed organiza-
tionally from its source, as when the printer of financial documents
relating to an impending stock split trades on that information.
II. Five Limitations of the White-Collar Crime Literature
on Organizational Wrongdoing
Since Sutherland (1945), the empirical criminological literature on
white-collar crime has abounded with examples of organizations as
violators. Critiques of that literature have drawn attention to five limi-
tations that the essays in this volume seek to address through intensive
case studies of industrywide violations of statutes and administrative
regulations.
The first, only partly addressed, is the general neglect of organiza-
tions as victims of law violations. This subject is only partly addressed
because we have not included cases of substantial victimization of orga-
nizations by common crimes-how, for example, public transportation
systems bear substantial losses of revenue from fare cheating or incur
substantial costs owing to vandalism. There are many other examples
of how minor crimes, such as employee theft, are more costly to organi-
zations than are felonies; a retailer that suffers "shrinkage" of 2, 4, or
10 percent of its inventory bears far greater financial burdens from
shoplifting and employee theft than from store robberies. The essays
in this volume focus far more on organizations as violators than as
victims and on individuals as indirect victims of organizational viola-
tions rather than on organizations as direct victims. The essays on the
S&L crisis are a notable exception, focusing on the victimization of
S&L organizations and its consequences for depositors and taxpayers.
A second major limitation of the white-collar crime literature is the
tendency to focus solely or preponderantly on large profit-making orga-
nizations and on the behavior of corporate officers and managers as
major offenders; many violations by and against organizations are com-
mitted by people in lower-ranking white-collar and blue-collar posi-
tions. The corruption of authority endemic in large public police orga-
nizations in the United States, for example, normally involves the rank
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and file and line supervisors rather than the top command. Reuter's
description of collusion in the cartage industry demonstrates how orga-
nizational offending is grounded in the behavior of many small-scale
entrepreneurs in one of the most demeaned occupations-garbage and
trash collection.
A third limitation has been the tendency to focus on particular
named organizations and the violations of their white-collar employees
rather than on how industrial and commercial organization creates and
sustains particular patterns of violation. The focus should be on oppor-
tunities the legal, economic, and regulatory structure of an industry
provide for patterned law-breaking by organizations. For example, an
examination of the highway construction industry might concentrate
on major changes in the structure of competition in the industry, in
the public bidding process and its regulations, and in supervision of
performance contracts awarded.
By focusing on industrial systems and the environments they create,
such as the savings and loan industry, or on market organization, such
as that of garbage and trash collection or stock transactions, one can
better understand how particular organizations and their employees
become violators as a consequence of system organization and change.
The two essays on the savings and loan industry and their lending and
investment practices illustrate how organizational practices come to be
regarded as law violations in a turbulent business environment. In the
essay on insider trading, Reichman argues that the new forms of insider
trading sought to corrupt the market itself-to change its dynamic
features. To understand insider trading, she locates it within the
changing structures of finance. Similarly, the essays on the S&L crisis
locate it within the conjunction of deregulation and the dynamic forces
affecting commercial real estate and the production and marketing of
commodities such as oil.
This limitation is closely related to a fourth. Typically, the control
of organizational law violations is investigated by studying the behavior
of enforcement or regulatory agencies and their agents and only rarely
by focusing on how enforcement or regulation interacts with an envi-
ronment. Braithwaite's account of nursing home regulation in this vol-
ume shows how comparative societal studies of nursing homes and
their regulation enhance our understanding not only of different regu-
latory processes but of the ways that organizations sometimes adapt to
their regulatory environments in ways that can undermine efforts to
attain their own goals. He demonstrates how the U.S. regulatory in-
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spection of nursing homes, which emphasizes maintenance of paper
records of staff and organizational compliance with rules and regula-
tions, leads to organizations that are more concerned with ritualistic
bureaucratic compliance than with the quality of the care they provide.
In contrast, the more goal-directed regulatory regime in Australia gen-
erates small nursing homes focused on giving personal rather than
institutional centered care. He concludes, moreover, that empow-
erment of staff and residents through local accountability and advocacy
provides more humane care than does the more bureaucratized Ameri-
can approach. Such studies accordingly approach the problem of con-
trolling organizational behavior in conformity with law as one of mu-
tual adaptations of regulators and regulated.
Finally, there is a tendency to treat violations of administrative law
as violations of criminal law. Although individual contributors to this
volume have not always maintained a distinction between the two, in
part because willful, persistent, or extreme violations of administrative
regulations can constitute criminal offenses, many violations of law
involve administrative regulations and are subject to administrative
rather than criminal law proceedings. The failure to distinguish these
two bodies of public law usually carries over into treating all organiza-
tional violators as white-collar criminals and all organizational viola-
tions as white-collar crimes.
This conflation of criminal and administrative law has some major
consequences for consideration of strategies of social control over orga-
nizational behavior (Reiss 1984). Regulatory agencies are primarily in-
tent on inducing compliance with the law-to prevent the violation of
law. Criminal law systems, by contrast, are organized on deterrence
principles-the detection of violations and punishment of violators to
deter future violations. Because compliance systems are oriented to-
ward prevention, they are premonitory. They attend to conditions that
increase the risk of violation and seek to have the organization alter
those conditions so as to increase the likelihood of conformity with the
law. Because law enforcement systems seek to prevent future violations
by punishing violators, they are oriented toward detecting violations,
apprehending and charging violators, and imposing penalties that will
deter the violators or others from violating. While each system seeks
to prevent violations, they do so by quite different means.
Although penalties can be invoked in either compliance or deterrence
systems, they are integral only to deterrence systems. Deterrence sys-
tems assume that penalties have a causal effect in preventing future
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violations. In compliance systems, the emphasis is on rewarding com-
pliance or withholding the potential imposition of penalties to induce
compliance. In compliance systems, penalties are principally used as
threats rather than as sanctions. Typically, sanctions are suspended or
withdrawn when acceptable compliance is demonstrated.
Some of the essays in this volume illuminate these contrasts between
the two systems. Braithwaite's essay on nursing home regulation shows
how inspections can be used to induce compliance rather than to pun-
ish violators. Yeager's essay on water pollution likewise demonstrates
that compliance is a process rather than an end state and details the
gradual evolution of a compliance system to control water pollution.
11I. Controlling the Behavior of Organizations
A central problem of modern societies is to control the behavior of
organizations in the public interest. There are several principal ways
of doing so.
One is to rely on governments to make laws and rules governing the
behavior of organizations and to establish techniques for their enforce-
ment or compliance with them. Our civil, criminal, and administrative
law systems are the foundation of legal control of organizational behav-
ior. Public prosecution, civil litigation, and regulatory actions are their
hallmarks.
Another is to trust that market mechanisms can control organiza-
tional behavior. Markets usually operate in conjunction with some
form of formal or informal regulatory system. A presumption of formal
deregulation is that an open or free market controls behavior in the
public interest. The two essays on the crisis in the saving and loan
industry examine from different perspectives the ways in which dereg-
ulation contributed to that crisis. Pontell and Calavita attribute the
S&L crisis to the conjunction of thrift deregulation with federal insur-
ance on deposits, which created a "criminogenic environment" that
provided extensive opportunities for fraud at minimal risk to managers
and attracted dishonest entrepreneurs to the industry. Zimring and
Hawkins, by contrast, advance a more structuralist explanation. The
structure of incentives produced by deregulation was a major explana-
tion for the behavior that resulted in record losses. The symbolic poli-
tics of deregulation rather than technical market economics drove the
deregulation of thrift institutions to their debacle.
Market mechanisms of control are more or less indifferent to the
legality of commodities or services, however, and competition may be
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restricted-by illegal means such as coercive violence, as well as by legal
means. What is commonly called "organized crime" is a form of control
imposed on the marketing of illegal commodities or services or the use
of illegal means to control transactions in legal commodities. The essay
on garbage collection by Reuter documents how the marketing of a
legal commodity-garbage-in the New York metropolitan area has
been dominated by a private cartage industry that operates in restraint
of trade through customer allocation agreements that treat customers
as assets. He shows that both law enforcement and regulation have
failed to eliminate these agreements and, indeed, that they have
achieved a more legal form, thereby enhancing the power of racketeers.
A third way to control the behavior of organizations in the public
interest is to depend on aggrieved parties-typically private organiza-
tions or individuals-to exercise control over organizations through
civil suits for compensatory or punitive damages. This form of control
is limited, however, by the extent to which liabilities are insured as
well as by the extent and liquidity of organizational assets. Federal
insurance on thrift deposits effectively obviated the need for civil litiga-
tion for recovery of deposits in S&L institutions and may even have
encouraged imprudent lending, as Pontell and Calavita argue. Severe
declines in the market value of housing, offices, and retail buildings,
moreover, limited the government's potential recovery of loss as an
insurer.
Braithwaite points to other private alternatives-the use of advo-
cacy groups to represent client interests in nursing homes, the em-
powerment of staff vis-A-vis the power exercised by management,
and self-regulation. Self-regulation exists when collectivities of self-
interested organizations develop or adopt norms of behavior and ways
to get members to conform with them. It often is adjunctive to control
exercised by regulatory agencies. Reichman in her essay on insider
trading points out that the National Association of Securities Dealers
(NASD) provides adjunctive support to Securities and Exchange Com-
mission (SEC) rules governing conflicts of interest in multiservice secu-
rities firms. The erection of so-called Chinese Walls within a firm-
invisible procedural barriers that separate conflicts of interest within
the firm-is a recommended procedure by both NASD and the SEC.
Braithwaite's essay on nursing homes emphasizes that the homes with
the lowest rates of violations have a participatory regulatory structure
rather than a strictly hierarchical management structure.
The thematic volumes in the Crime and Justice series are testament
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to the need and the difficulties for multidisciplinary research and the-
ory that transcends the balkanizing partitions that divide academic dis-
ciplines. Too often, scholars and policy analysts from different special-
ties look at different aspects of a large and complex problem. The
cumulative result too often resembles the portrayal of an elephant as a
horse built by a committee. Criminologists interested in organizational
crime have tended to adhere to the white-collar-crime emphases de-
scribed earlier and too seldom have learned from sociologists of organi-
zation and bureaucracy, from economists and organizational theorists,
and from legal and regulatory literatures. Each of these in turn gener-
ally fails to benefit from each others' learning and from the criminolo-
gists. In commissioning the essays in this volume, we asked writers to
reach beyond their disciplinary grasps, and all have done so.
We hope these essays demonstrate that the understanding of organi-
zational law violations is enhanced by bringing an organizational and
social system analysis to the study of the behavior of organizations
rather than relying principally on the traditional criminological analy-
ses of white-collar and organized crimes and criminals. That under-
standing is enhanced also by expanding the horizons beyond the scope
of the criminal law and criminal justice to include administrative law
and legal regulation. These shifts in emphasis may open the way to
better control of law violations through both organizational compliance
and deterrence strategies.
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